Terms and model
'Disorientation' is used in clinical practice both as a descriptive and as an explanatory concept. Hence it may refer to an inability to 'know that' (verbal orientation) and 'know what' (behavioural orientation) (Ryle 1949) . But it also may refer to the fact that this incompetence results from a failure in some hypothetical orientation system. Orientation, it is believed, demands a proper fit between the subject's internal representation of his environment and the various reference systems (Bash 1955) . Since these systems are subject to Ichange, frequent updating of the internal maps is essential. Orientation is therefore considered as a dynamic process. Breakdowns in orientation may result from failures in the (I) monitoring of changes in the relevant reference system; (2) updating of internal maps; and (3) response to any perceived mismatching.
The generic term 'orientation failure' will refer in this paper to any clinically detected anomaly in verbal or behavioural orientation; 'false orientation' to a pathological reorientation in relation to a private reference system; 'double orientation' to a pathological state of orientation that oscillates between private and public reference systems; and 'disorientation' (proper) to inability to entrain onto any reference system, whether public or private.
A model (see Figure I ), mainly applicable to temporal and spatial orientation failures, is suggested. It assumes that external or public reference systems are partly based upon physical cues which lie beyond human control, and that humans orientate themselves vis-avis these systems by developing internal representations and integrating them into their cognitive systems.
According to this model, verbal and behavioural orientation may be examined by means of standard questions and observation of behaviour, respectively (McFie 1960) . Clinical observation shows that these two forms of orientation may break down separately. The model postulates that subjects suffering from a functional psychosis develop, as part of their delusional system, a cognitive bias which often leads to the development of a quasi-private reference system. It also postulates that patients suffering from dementia, because of their global cognitive breakdown, lose track of all reference systems. The orientation failures to be described are determined by whether the subject chooses to orientate himself in relation to public or private reference systems. Double orientation should obtain when simultaneous or rapidly alternating orientation occurs in relation to both systems; false orientation when there is a predominant orientation in favour of the private reference system; disorientation will obtain when no reference system is available to the subject on account of a breakdown in his monitoring capacity.
It is also suggested by the model that whilst double and false orientation are more often associated with the functional psychoses, disorientation is a hallmark of the organic psychiatric states. In functional terms disorientation should result from a state of cognitive collapse; double and false orientation, on the other hand, may necessitate a degree of cognitive competence.
The model also suggests that some continuity exists between normal orientation and its states of failure. This dynamic characteristic should make it potentially applicable to lesser psychopathological states where momentary failure of orientation may take place due to relatively sudden oscillation in cognitive or emotional variables (e.g. depersonalization; panic attacks; drug-induced states). To be of practical relevance to the understanding of these states, however, the model requires additional conceptual machinery which at this stage would render it cumbersome and inflexible.
Failures in time orientation Some believe that time orientation is the most vulnerable of all forms of orientation (Marchais 1981 , Hamilton 1974 . The term 'disorientation' has even been applied to psychotic patients who exhibit delusional distortions in their experience of duration (Lewis 1932 , Lehmann 1967 . It is perhaps important to separate the cases of genuine false orientation, as elicited by verbal and behavioural analysis, from subtle changes in the experiencing of duration which very rarely impair the orientation behaviour of the psychotic patient in the real world.
Time orientation depends upon the adequate reckoning of three reference systems: (I) 'official time', kept by public time-markers and conceptualized as a nest of subunits (year, month and date); (2) 'cued time' (e.g. awareness of time of day or of season of year) dependent upon correct recognition of external (e.g. climate, social rituals) and internal cues (proprioceptive sensations); (3) 'personal time', i.e. the individual's subjective experience of duration.
. Failures in the monitoring of official and cued time, which are common in organic mental disorder, may be associated with memory impairment; while distortions in the perception of personal time are frequently found amongst patients suffering from functional psychiatric disorder (e.g. severe anxiety, obsessional states, depression and schizophrenia).
Verbal temporal orientation is conventionally tested by asking some standard questions for which incorrect answers are considered as pathological. The definition of correctness, however, varies from clinician to clinician and this may lead to an unacceptable number of false negatives (Benton et al. 1964) .
.
Temporal disorientation in the organic mental states
Fluctuating temporal disorientation is considered as the hallmark of delirium (Lipowski 1980 ) and confusion (Porot & Planche 1969) . By the same token, persistent disorientation is described as a central symptom in dementia (Williams 1956 , Allison 1962 . Between 25 and 39% of brain-damaged subjects also show time disorientation and so may do patients with diffuse cortical disease (Levin & Benton 1975) . It is conventionally accepted that in these cases failures of memory, attention or perception may play a causal role (Chedru & Geschwind 1972) . However, there is the possibility that involvement of a more specific neural network may be also a causal factor. For example, Ellen & Powell (1963) found that lesions in the zona incerta may affect the 'scallop' response profile in rats (i.e. the distribution of responding during fixed-interval reinforcement), and Efron (1963) suggested that in humans 'there is a fundamental mechanism or process related to the requirement of "time-labelling" of input or output signals which is located in the dominant temporal lobe' ; dysfunction of this mechanism could explain, for example, the disturbance of subjective time sense occasionally seen in temporal lobe epilepsy. Spiegel et al. (1956) have described time (but not space) orientation failure in schizophrenic patients who had undergone psychosurgical lesions in the dorsomedial thalamic nucleus; this transient defect, referred to as 'chronotaraxis', was believed to occur independently from clouding of consciousness. The fact that some of these patients were observed to exhibit some memory defect, throws some doubt on the 'specific lesion' interpretation given to these states of temporal orientation failure. The same cautionary note applies to the so-called 'time agnosia syndrome' (Davidson 1941 ) (amnesia, confusion, time disorientation and difficulty in estimating time) described in 7 male patients with traumatic, alcoholic or vascular brain disturbance; and to the disorder of 'chronognosie' described by Bouman & Griinbaum (1929) in a patient affected by a viral infection. Critchley (1953) may have been right in his claim that 'Pure temporal disorientation, that is, occurring independently of spatial disorders, is a rare phenomenon'.
Time orientation failures in the affective disorders
Disturbances in the perception of personal time rarely amount to temporal disorientation. Thus Bouchard (1926) described shortening (raccourcissement) of experienced duration in melancholia, prolongation (allongement) in mania, and bidirectional variations in anxiety states. found that a sample of Maudsley Hospital doctors subjected to a stressful situation (speaking in public) tended to under-or overestimate time; the authors speculated that these altered responses might have been mediated by depersonalization experiences. Indeed, depersonalization (defined as self-estrangement and body image diffusion) has been found associated with feelings of temporal disintegration in 37 acutely psychotic patients (Freeman & Melges 1977) . and Lehmann (1967) have also reported that depressive patients (during and after their illness) tend to 'over-produce' time (e.g. measured a 30 second interval as being 40 seconds). Severe depression, of the type associated with pseudodementia, may also lead to cognitive impairment and to temporal orientation failure (McAllister 1981) . Regis (1906) described confusion and disorientation in a subgroup of patients suffering from dementia praecox. Jung (1977) believed that these patients only give the impression of being disorientated due to the fact that they pay preferential attention to their 'illusions'. Both Bleuler (1950) and Kraepelin (1919) concurred with this interpretation, although the latter mentioned that in the stuporous patient 'perception of the environment may be occasionally disordered' (Berrios 1981b) . Later writers considered verbal descriptions by schizophrenic patients of distortions in time sense as evidence for time disorientation; indeed Minkowski (1927) , Schilder (1936) and Seeman (1976) believed this symptom to be a fundamental feature of the disease. Measurements of time 'production' and 'reproduction' in schizophrenic patients show that patients' performance is significantly poorer than controls (Garza & Worchel 1956 , Rabin 1957 , Guertin & Rabin 1960 ). Ciompi (1961) reported a female patient with 'pseudoecstasy' who experienced telescoped perceptions of past, present and future. Goldstone (1967) found that underestimation of duration in schizophrenic patients can be improved by neuroleptics.
Time orientation failures in schizophrenia
The validity of these early findings is marred by a number of methodological issues: entry diagnostic criteria are unclear; level of chronicity of the disorder is rarely mentioned; and reporting on whether patients had received electroconvulsive therapy or insulin coma treatment is often incomplete. ; Chronicity of the condition seems to be an important factor: for example, evidence has recently been marshalled concerning the presence of time disorientation during the defect state. Le Guen (1963) has described patients who denied that any time had elapsed since the beginning of their illness, and called it the 'congealed time syndrome'. Crow & Mitchell (1975) have referred to a similar phenomenon in chronic male schizophrenic patients who believed themselves to be five or more years younger than they really were; however, they provide no adequate information on the cognitive state of their sample. Another complicating factor seems to be that age by itself may influence time estimation in schizophrenic patients (Lehmann 1967) . In fact, changes in cognitive function may also be relevant to this problem: for example, Letemendia & Harris (1967) found that chlorpromazine tended to worsen disorientation in a group of untreated chronic schizophrenics. Distortions of time sense may also be greater in patients with paranoid delusions and. in those suffering from depersonalization (Melges & Fougerousse 1966 , Freeman & Melges 1978 . This effect, however, is not specific to schizophrenia as it has also been described in toxic states induced by tetrahydrocannabitol and alcohol (Melges et al. 1974) .
On the other hand, Joslyn & Hutzell (1979) have found no significant difference on temporal disorientation, as measured by the test of Benton et al. (1964) , between schizophrenic patients and normal controls; indeed hospitalized schizophrenic patients were less likely to be disorientated to time than brain-damaged patients.
It can therefore be concluded that no clear evidence is yet available that disorientation proper is part of the symptomatology of schizophrenia; ill-described time orientation failures and distortions in subjective time may, however, be seen in patients suffering from this condition. On occasions, concomitant confusion and cognitive impairment (not necessarily resulting directly from the primary condition) may give rise to disorientation states. The age of the patient, his symptomatology and response to neuroleptics must also be considered as influential factors.
Failures in space orientation
In psychiatric practice, spatial disorientation is diagnosed when the patient is unable (1) to reply correctly to space orientation questions, or (2) to orientate himself to his own or to the hospital surroundings (after a reasonable period since admission has elapsed). Verbal and behavioural space orientation, however, can be found dissociated in clinical practice. Fluctuating spatial disorientation (Porot & Planche 1969) and a tendency to mistake the unfamiliar for the familiar (Levin I956a) constitute diagnostic features of organic confusion. A similar disorder has also been described accompanying dementia states (Williams (1956) and Korsakoff's syndrome (O'Keefe & Nadel 1978) when it is believed to result from mamillary body or hippocampal damage. Spatial orientation seems more resistant to noxae than temporal orientation (Hamilton 1974 , Marchais 1981 .
Neuropsychologists, on the other hand, use the term 'spatial disorientation' in a different way. This is diagnosed when a subject is unable to apprehend 'spatial relationships among or within objects, namely is unable to localize objects in space; trace a path or follow a route; memorize the location of objects or places; read, count or exercise adequate visuoconstructive ability' (Semmes et al. 1963) . These spatial orientation failures are testdependent, are not associated with temporal disorientation and are often correlated with identifiable corticoparietal lesions (Benton 1969) .
Two systems seem to be involved in space orientation: one to gather and store information, the other to monitor and update the internal map. O'Keefe & Nadel (1978) refer to these as the 'place' and 'misplace' systems, respectively. The place system permits the subject to 'locate himself in a familiar environment without reference to any specific sensory input, to go from one place to another independent of particular inputs (cues) or outputs (responses) and to link together conceptually parts of an environment which have never been experienced at the same time. The misplace system is primarily responsible for exploration, a species-specific behaviour which functions to build maps of new environments and to incorporate new information into existing maps'. ' This view of spatial orientation has clinical relevance. For example, confused or delirious patients often believe that they are still at home and mistake the 'unfamiliar for the familiar' (Levin I956b); occasionally they even believe that a close relative has been replaced by an impostor (McCallum 1973) . This behavioural rigidity or perseveration probably reflects a dysfunction in the misplace system and a consequent inability to update the cognitive map. On the other hand, the spatial disorientation exhibited by patients suffering from dementia may result from a disruption of the place system (mediated by memory) (Bash 1955 , Zangwill 1977 , Benson et al. 1976 .
Most clinicians agree that geographic disorientation (as seen in confusional states) is a different phenomenon from the discreet syndromes described by the neuropsychologists and considered as related to parietal lobe dysfunction. Indeed the latter does not seem to lead to topographic disorientation (i.e. spatial map updating difficulty) or to failures in topographical memory. On the other hand, disorders of topographical orientation are often found in association with memory failure of the type observed in hippocampal impairment (e.g. Korsakoff's syndrome) (Benton 1969 , Paterson & Zangwill 1944 .
Failures in personal orientation
Personal disorientation refers to a clinical state in which the subject does not know who he is (Bash I95~, Scharfetter 1976) . This loss in personal identity is met with, in a number of clinical situations. When persistent it tends to reflect severe pathology, as it entails loss of or inability to retrieve overlearned information. Loss of personal identity may be fleetingly experienced by subjects emerging from deep sleep, anaesthesia and twilight states. The acutely psychotic patient may entertain the delusional belief that he is someone else. Patients suffering from organic psychiatric disorders usually become personally disorientated only during the severe stage of the condition.
Failures in personal orientation may develop insidiously, with the episodes of sporadic disorientation becoming progressively longer until the patient's identity becomes totally obliterated; on other occasions it may be of sudden onset: when this occurs in the context of a moderate dementia state it usually signifies intercurrent cerebrovascular accident, infections, or other acute medical conditions (Lipowski 1980) . Personal disorientation in the context of chronic bniin disease is always accompanied by spatiotemporal disorientation and carries a bad prognosis (Rabins & F olstein 1982) .
Momentary episodes of personal disorientation can occasionally occur associated with transient global amnesia (TGA) and fugue states. TGA affects the middle aged and elderly, is short-lived (hours rather than days) and during an attack patients may exhibit paresis and marked distress and anxiety (Heathfield et al. 1973) . Hysterical fugue states on the other hand last longer, occur in younger subjects and are accompanied by a psychogenic loss of episodic memory (Akhtar & Brenner 1979 , Janet 1893 .
Conclusions
Failures in the orientation to time, space and person can be temporary or long-lasting, and verbal or behavioural. The cut-off point between correct and incorrect orientation varies from clinician to clinician. Detailed clinicopathological correlations are unavailable, for no common model seems to exist that brings the main orientation failures together. Hence little is known about their incidence, types, diagnostic and prognostic value.
In conventional psychiatric teaching, orientation failures constitute prima facie evidence for the presence of organic aetiology. In general, disorientation states are not uncommon in general hospital patients. They often are under-diagnosed and remain overshadowed by the clinical seriousness of the underlying physical condition. Although clinicians tend to consider disorientation as an unimportant complication, which is expected to resolve once the causal process has been dealt with, there is some evidence that delirious disorientation may, at least in some diagnostic groups, herald fatal outcome (Rabins & Folstein 1982) .
Little is known about the meaning, prognostic value and natural history of disorientation occurring in the context of dementia, in spite of the fact that it is clinically obtrusive and constitutes an important obstacle to management and rehabilitation (Powell-Proctor & Miller 1982) . It should be concluded that organic disorientation is a different phenomenon from the orientation failure (or false orientation) reported in relation to the functional psychoses. The two, however, may coexist in demented patients who also exhibit delusions and hallucinations (Ballinger et al. 1982) .
